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Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin - Vergleichende Analyse Politischer Systeme

Forschung

Aktuell arbeitet das Lehrbereichsteam an verschiedenen Forschungsprojekten:

 

Portfolio design in European democracies


The design of government portfolios – that is, the distribution of competencies among government ministries and office holders – has been largely ignored in the study of executive and coalition politics. In this research project, we study portfolio design as a substantively and theoretically relevant phenomenon: why are jurisdictions moved from one government department to another? Why and when do political actors create new ministries dealing with particular policy issues? And what are the implications of these changes on public policy?

 

Output:

Sieberer, Ulrich, Thomas M. Meyer, Hanna Bäck, Andrea Ceron, Albert Falcó-Gimeno, Isabelle Guinaudeau, Martin Ejnar Hansen, Kristoffer Kolltveit, Tom Louwerse, Wolfgang C. Müller, and Thomas Persson (forthcoming). ‘The political dynamics of portfolio design in European democracies.’ British Journal of Political Science. DOI: 10.1017/S0007123419000346.

 

Citizens' perceptions of the government formation process


Although parliamentary election results are often interpreted as the “will of the people”, they often fail to give clear instructions for government formation. Instead, when no single party wins the absolute majority of seats in the legislature, which parties end up in government is the result of post-election coalition bargaining processes. In several new research projects, we aim to study how voters evaluate post-election bargaining processes: which parties are seen as legitimate to enter government based on the election results? Do party supporters accept the necessity of policy compromises for the sake of government participation?

 

The distribution of portfolio allocation in coalition governments


How are ministerial portfolios allocated in multiparty governments? While Gamson’s Law suggests that the quantitative allocation is proportional to party size, considerably less is known about the qualitative dimension of distributing ministerial portfolios. Building upon recent advancements in portfolio allocation research, we explore party preferences for individual portfolios and the associated policy payoffs.

Output:

Ecker, Alejandro, and Thomas M. Meyer (forthcoming). ‘Fairness and qualitative portfolio allocation in multiparty governments.’ Public Choice. DOI: 10.1007/s11127-019-00658-8.

'Qualitative portfolio allocation in European multiparty governments' (with Alejandro Ecker)

 

The architecture of coalition governance


Coalition governments are vulnerable to problems resulting from diverging interests of the cabinet parties, threats, and external shocks that may lead to premature government termination. To cope with these challenges, they typically employ mechanisms of mutual control. In this research project, we study whether and how government parties combine mechanisms of mutual control to make coalition governance work. Moreover, we study the potential consequences of the architecture of coalition governance for a government's performance.

Output:

'The Architecture of Coalition Governance' (with Alejandro Ecker & Wolfgang C. Müller) 'Coalition governance and government survival' (with Alejandro Ecker & Wolfgang C. Müller)