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**Is the “Inner Wall” Here to Stay? Justice Ideologies in
Unified Germany**

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Is the “Inner Wall” Here to Stay? Justice Ideologies in Unified Germany

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In this paper, value differences in former East and West Germany are studied in order to determine which values can be expected to change, perhaps leading to a gradual convergence of East and West, and which values will resist change for some time to come. If it is true, as some observers say, that the unified Germany is still a divided country—not so much in terms of material living conditions but ideologically, it is attempted to predict in what way the ideological “inner wall” is a fact to be reckoned with even in the future. Based on the International Social Justice Project (ISJP) data from 1991 and 1996, the focus is on particular values—on four justice ideologies: egalitarianism, individualism, ascriptivism, and fatalism which are derived from grid–group theory, and it is tested whether these four ideologies form a common set of beliefs in East and West Germany. Results show that they do, but that East and West Germans have very different ideological preferences within this ideological framework. Therefore it is next tested whether the differences are rooted in cultural distinctions between the East and the West or whether they can be explained by the social positions individuals in East and West Germany hold—and by the rational interests attached to these positions. Using a structural equation approach to examine the genuine east–west effects and the structural effects, we find little evidence for cultural differences but ample evidence for social structural determination. From these findings it is concluded that the ideological “inner wall” running through Germany is bound to fall if living conditions on both sides become even more alike.

KEY WORDS: comparative social justice research; unification of East and West Germany; transformation of postcommunist states; justice ideologies, grid–group theory.

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As is believed by some observers, the Germany of the 1990s is unified politically but is still a divided country. Although it is true that the wall made of concrete has disappeared, an “inner wall” has supposedly taken its place separating East and West Germans ideologically (Brunner and Walz, 1998; Maier, 1997; Sa’adah, 1998). We may have to accept that the historical experience of having lived under different political and economic rules for almost 40 years cannot be overcome overnight, or within a few short years of unification. On the surface, the material living conditions and the institutional framework have changed with remarkable speed, making East and West Germany look very much alike, but the attitudes and values people treasure seem to resist short-term modification. It may well take generations before they assimilate.

Although this would, after all, be a hopeful prospect, value change can neither be guaranteed nor predicted. Those who lament the slowness with which ideological barriers begin to crumble are still convinced that one day convergence will have been accomplished and that, once again, one country with one common value system will emerge. Indeed, Germany, of all states, can claim to have the potential of adapting to democratic virtues most swiftly and efficiently; it was here—in West Germany—that after the end of World War II totalitarianism was replaced by democracy with extraordinary determination, and though it seems to take longer than originally thought, there can be no doubt that after Germany’s unification in 1990 the ideological cleavage between the East and the West of the country will also diminish.

But is this hope justified? How can we be sure that 40 years of communism on the one side of the wall and 40 years of capitalism on the other have not created different thought styles so resistant to change that we may have to concede that different *Ways of World Making* (Goodman, 1978) have been at work, ensuing incommensurate styles of perceiving, thinking, making value judgments, and voicing political preferences? This would mean that the “inner wall” is here to stay. As a working hypothesis this might be more down-to-earth than the hope that eastern and western thought styles will assimilate easily.

As Samuel Huntington (1996) has emphasized recently, historically there are examples of societies that have never found the peace of inner unity. Russia, Mexico, Turkey, and Australia are all countries that have managed to survive in spite of the fact that they have in themselves populations of different cultural origin and identification. Value consensus is something far out of reach for these societies. Apart from the evidence these historical models provide, sociologists have long struggled to free themselves from functionalist thinking according to which value consensus and the harmonization of ends were thought to be prerequisites of any stable and enduring society. Ideal-typical as it was, the functionalist conception of society depreciated the possibility that multicultural and value heterogeneous societies could exist, in spite of the fact that modern societies throughout are characterized by diversity and permanent value competition. To postulate homogeneity, therefore, is of little help when doing empirical research on real societies.

The aim of this paper then is to study value differences in former East and West Germany and to determine which values can be expected to change, perhaps leading to the gradual convergence of East and West, and which values will resist change for some time to come. What we attempt to do is to predict—with due caution—to what extent the “inner wall” is a fact to be reckoned with even in the future.

To pursue this aim, it will not be sufficient simply to take stock and to compare distributions of attitudes and value preferences in both regions of the country; what we need first of all is a category system classifying values according to their “changeability.” Our analytical tool for this is the distinction between *normative* and *rational* types of values, a distinction originally introduced by Talcott Parsons (1937). Of normative values, Parsons says that they are based on tradition and cultural fundamentals characterizing a society, often mediated through religious doctrines, and have long-lasting effects on the socialization practices in the course of generations. Normative values, therefore, are resistant to short-term changes because they are part of the common “cultural heritage” that makes members of a society identify with their society and this gives them a feeling of solidarity and sameness. Although all members of a society share normative values, at least ideally, rational values arise as reactions to specific—rational—interests different groups in a society may have. Rational values are adaptive, they are created in response to the social situation an individual is confronted with wishing to maintain, or even improve this situation. Thus, only those members in a society who occupy similar social positions have similar interests—they entertain the same rational values. Thus, although normative values are held by more or less all members of a society and are relatively change-resistant, rational values are group-specific and may undergo short-term changes that depend on the shifting interests of group members. In both cases, we can safely postulate different causal determinants: It is “culture” that shapes normative beliefs, and “structure” that determines which beliefs certain subpopulations of a society hold (Archer, 1988).⁴

Against this background, the question we pose in this paper is whether the values Germans in East and West support are more culturally or more structurally determined. Based on tradition, religious doctrines, or political indoctrination, are there particular East and West German *cultural fundamentals* that have shaped the value beliefs, or are these beliefs nothing more than responses to the social position of an individual reflecting his or her *rational interests*? In short, is it culture or structure that makes people support particular values? This is a crucial question if we want to know how permanent the “inner wall” is going to be. We need to determine which beliefs in East and West Germany are normative and which are rational. Only with regard to the latter we can anticipate change and ultimately convergence between East and West—we can predict that rational values

⁴Because normative values are held by the majority or even all members of a society and rational values only by specific groups, we also say that normative values are *primary* and rational values *secondary* (Wegener and Liebig, 1995).

will become increasingly similar as living conditions in both parts of the country become similar. If there are, in contrast, differences in the realm of normative values, they will outlive the present generations, by far giving the “inner wall” a continued existence.

In this paper, we are only interested in specific types of values—in justice beliefs or, as we shall say, *justice ideologies*. Justice ideologies are preferences that people have about how and according to which principles goods should be distributed in a society. We say, for instance: “Social and economic inequalities should be adjusted so that they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged,” thus expressing our preference for a particular distribution principle (in this case an abbreviated version of John Rawls’ difference principle [Rawls, 1993]). We make a statement of how society should be ordered if it is to be a just society. That is why we say justice ideologies are *order-related* justice judgments.⁵

Order-related justice judgments are of a different kind from justice judgments in which the *rewards* individuals receive are evaluated. “It is just that person x be given \$500,000 for an annual income” would be a *reward-related* justice judgment because here we consider only what a just reward (for a particular person and job) is, we do not voice our preference for or against a distribution regime of a just society, as order-related judgments would do.⁶

We are making this distinction here because order- and reward-related justice judgments have different determinants calling for different explanations. Although social psychologists are well underway to discover law-like rules that govern reward-related justice judgments that are relatively context-free (Berger *et al.*, 1972; Jasso, 1980, 1989; Jasso and Wegener, 1997), we do not expect to find such regularities with regard to order-related justice ideologies. The preferences an individual has for certain justice principles and distribution regimes will always depend on his or her social environment, position, upbringing, and past experiences, that is, only in regard of justice ideologies can we ask whether they are normative or rational.

Thus, restricting ourselves to justice ideologies, we will ask whether the distinct ideological features of East and West Germany have induced different normative values on both sides of the iron curtain or, if there are value differences, whether they were generated by differing material conditions and dissimilarities in the respective social structures. We will approach an answer to this question in three consecutive steps. We must first come to a decision about methodology: how do we want to empirically separate cultural from structural influences? Two complementary methodological criteria serving this purpose will be suggested.

⁵This is what Pareto (1962) has termed *deviations*, a system of knowledge claiming truth (see also Boudon, 1988; Shils, 1966).

⁶The distinction is related to Brickman’s distinction between “macrojustice” and “microjustice” (Brickman, *et al.*, 1981; Huber and Form, 1973; Mann, 1970), but what we stress here is the difference between *principles* and *rewards*, not that one is directed towards society and the other towards the individual.

Next we will identify the justice ideologies we want to study. In order to define relevant justice ideologies, we borrow from the grid–group theory of Mary Douglas (1982, 1986, 1996) extending this theory in such a way so as to identify particular thought styles of justice. Finally, operationalizing these thought styles, we will use the 1991 and 1996 data files of the International Social Justice Project (ISJP) to test whether the thought styles of justice are determined by either culture, social structure or both.

METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

By what logic can we separate the influence of culture from that of structure in the emergence of attitudes? In this study, we use two methodological approaches (Galtung, 1982; Kohn, 1989): the *short-term change approach* and the *residual variation approach*.

In the first approach we look at short-term changes. What has happened over a given period of time? If we can detect short-term changes in justice beliefs in either or both parts of Germany, we will have some justification for labeling these changes “structural,” and not “cultural.” This is so because changes of attitudes, within a few years, occur only if the attitudes are not part of the cultural heritage of a society, if they have not been socialized lastingly and deeply. Aggregate changes over a short period of time would be indicative of the rational concerns of those who endorse the attitudes. It is easily possible for them to give up these attitude and to take on new ones if this is what external circumstances and self-interests demand. Thus, looking at East and West Germany over time, changing justice ideologies would speak against the “normativity” of these ideologies, opening the opportunity for the convergence of values of East and West in a foreseeable period of time.

According to the second approach, the residual variation approach, we first determine what effects *structural* determinants have on the justice ideologies of individuals living in either the East or the West. Only if there is *variation remaining unexplained* in comparing the two parts of Germany, that is, that cannot be attributed to structural factors, we conclude that this variation may be ascribed to the influence of “culture.” As a precondition, of course, we must have a theory available about how the social structure is relevant for the development of attitudes and values in a society. We may well follow here Max Weber’s rule of explaining social action which requires that we first attempt to explain social behavior by the rational motives of the individuals; only if and to the extent that this is unsuccessful, it is justified to turn to irrational and normative causes for explaining the behavior. So, “culture” is the second choice, but if all individualistic explanations fail, its influence is taken to be relevant. Technically, the residual variation approach calls for a set of hierarchical multivariate models on data pooled over East and West Germany. As a baseline model, we would have only the east–west

effects. If these effects disappear after adding structural variables as controls in subsequent models, we conclude that individual attributes suffice to explain the variation, that is, that there are no genuine east–west or “region effects.” Thus, in the residual variation approach, cultural influence is, very simply, that proportion of the variation that cannot be explained by structure (Galtung, 1982).

ISJP data on Germany offer the opportunity to apply both approaches since we not only have cross-sectional samples of Eastern and Western Germans in 1991 but also a replication of the original study 5 years later. Thus, we can look at change over time as well as at their explanatory sources.

GRID–GROUP THEORY AND THE FOUR THOUGHT STYLES OF JUSTICE

We will next sketch out briefly a theory of justice ideologies and how these are determined by structural features. Mary Douglas’ grid–group theory serves as a guideline for defining and classifying justice ideologies and for explaining how they come into existence. In her influential article *Cultural Bias* (1982), Douglas assumes that the convictions and values individuals hold are reactions to the social conditions in which they live. Prevailing beliefs and values help individuals to “justify” their actions in relation to their social environment. These convictions and values represent “implicit cosmologies,” in Douglas’ terms, or specific “ways of life”; thus, there are different “social types” that have particular “cultural biases” brought about by specific social environments. Douglas assumes that there are only four social environments and hence only four cosmologies and social types. This is so because the social conditions in which we live vary along two dimensions—using Mary Douglas’s own terminology: in gradations of *grid* and *group* (Fig. 1).

Grid means that all social environments are, to some extent, subject to external constraints. These constraints typically stem from hierarchical structures and the regulations associated with the social hierarchy. The stricter and more extensive these constraints are, the more are people unable to dictate their own actions. However, the social environments are also characterized by the extent to which individuals belong to specific social groups. The more closely an individual is incorporated into such social entities, the more likely his or her decisions will be affected by group norms. Thus, the social environment of an individual contains either strong or weak *hierarchical constraints* and at the same time it involves individuals in either strong or weak *social group closure*. By considering only the extreme positions on both dimensions, we are able to construct a taxonomy of four typical social constellations. These are associated with the four cosmologies defined by Douglas associated with four social types: the hierarchists, the enclavists, the individualists, and the isolates (Table I). All four emerge as reactions to the social circumstances in which individuals live. The following descriptions of the

Table I. The Grid–Group Paradigm and the Four Thought Styles of Justice

	Weak Group	Strong Group
<i>The Grid–Group Paradigm</i>		
High Grid	Isolate	Hierarchist
Low Grid	Individualist	Enclavist
<i>Four Thought Styles of Justice</i>		
High Grid	Fatalism	Ascriptivism
Low Grid	Individualism	Egalitarianism

cosmologies are given by Douglas (1982, 1986, 1996) and others (Spickard, 1989; Thompson *et al.*, 1990):

Hierarchists: In the situation of both strong group ties and strong hierarchical structures within a society, individuals find it only natural to live in closed groups and to be subjected to the norms of this group. They are also used to the rigid rules dictated by their “place” in society. An example would be the member of a Hindu *social cast*, deriving his rights and duties from his social position and living in strict separation from other social groups. His social and hierarchical position is given to him ascriptively. This describes the *grid* under which the individual lives. At the same time the individual is fully aware that she shares her fate with only the members of her own group.




Fig. 1. The grid–group coordinates.

Enclavists: An enclavist cosmology consists of individuals who also have strong group ties but, contrary to hierarchists, do not feel the pressure of hierarchically dictated restrictions. *Strong group/low grid* means that individuals are likely to give in to the pressures of group solidarity. Hierarchical constraints are less important to them, meaning that incumbents of high positions usually do not enjoy any type of special rights. An extreme example of this cosmology would be a member of a *commune* where all material and symbolically created inequalities have been abolished.

Individualists: Individualism results out of a situation in which not only the hierarchically determined constraints are weak, but at the same time group pressure and solidarity are low, thereby allowing the individual a high amount of freedom of movement and control. The self-made *entrepreneur* represents the prototype of this cosmology, as his or her success lies in the conviction that the only thing that counts is individual achievement.

Isolates: Individuals exposed to firm restrictions stemming from their positions within a social hierarchy, without having the support of group solidarity will in time come to fatalistically comply with the inevitable and to surrender to what fate decrees. The *non-unionized textile worker* of nineteenth century England is an example of this type of social condition. Of the four types of cosmology holders, isolates are clearly those who are the most unfortunate.

These four social types and their cosmologies make up the panorama of ideological biases in grid–group theory. As the theory assumes, they structure all life domains and our beliefs within those domains. We take on a particular belief and act in accordance with it not, however, because of psychological preferences, dispositions or temperament, but in order to justify our existence and to protect our self-identity in the particular social environment in which we are placed. Among the thought styles (Fleck, 1935) so defined, questions of distributive social justice stand out: who should be given the *responsibility* for distributing goods among the members of society and what should distribution *outcomes* be like? These are the two facets of social justice. Due to their different grid–group locations, hierarchists, enclavists, individualists, and isolates are likely to diverge greatly on these issues and they will therefore also have different views about social justice. We may thus distinguish four different *thought styles of justice* paralleling the four basic cosmologies (Liebig, 1997; Wegener and Liebig, 1995).

Hierarchists, first, will have a vested interest in keeping the responsibility for prevailing social inequalities impersonal. They maintain that the factual distribution of privileges and goods, although in fact ascribed, is natural and self-evident and therefore good. We call this type of justice ideology *ascriptivism*. Enclavists, on the other hand, appeal to authority. They hold the state ultimately responsible for the unjust distribution of wealth. Hence, the redistribution of resources that aim to fulfill the egalitarian wish for maximum equality should, in their view, also be the responsibility of the state. This is therefore the justice ideology of

egalitarianism.⁷ Individualists, in contrast, hold that only achievers are rewarded with success and that a system of free competition is fair and functional; they support *individualism* as justice ideology. This is in direct contrast to the point of view of the isolates who blame the “system” for his or her unfortunate situation. Feeling at the mercy of a “system” that denies them justice they tend to accept their situation *fatalistically*.

Thus, the differences as to who is responsible and what outcomes are preferred offer an important basis for the operationalization of the social justice ideologies according to grid–group theory.

STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS

From the perspective of an empirical investigation, the next relevant question is how the structural characteristics of individuals in Germany affect justice beliefs, that is, how the grid–group positions individuals occupy shape their beliefs. We proceed on the assumption that *sex*, *age*, *occupational prestige*, *social mobility*, and *city size* are all factors that influence the allocation of individuals to one of the four types of justice ideologies. If the preferences for particular justice ideologies have structural causes—as grid–group theory implies—then these positional characteristics should have effects on the preference strength of ideologies, in both East and West Germany.

In this respect, a number of plausible hypotheses can be investigated empirically. Women, for instance, would be more likely to be proponents of the egalitarian thought style and would favor individualistic values less than men. This is so because women are traditionally less integrated into hierarchical social relationships; they are instead subject to role expectations emphasizing solidarity and *gemeinschaft* values. Women more than men, therefore, should be found in the *low grid/strong group* corner of the grid–group paradigm. Conversely, one can expect to find older people to lean towards ascriptivism (*high grid/strong group*) because they have reached certain levels in their career, whereas upward mobile individuals would probably prefer individualism as their justice ideology (*low grid/weak group*); at least in their self-image the upward mobile will attribute success in life to their own talents and hard work, not to external forces. We would also presume that those who occupy high prestige and status positions are fairly resistant to fatalistic justice views, just as self-interest will make them reluctant to favor egalitarian redistribution measures.

As arguments of this kind can easily be inferred from grid–group theory, we must be careful not to make across-the-board generalizations. Looking only at the demographic attributes of individuals disregards the particular circumstances that may be typical of a certain society and of a particular historical period. Women in

⁷Since it is based on the enclavist cosmology, egalitarianism has also a strong *etatistic* component. It is the state or communal organization that should take equalizing redistribution measures.

the former German Democratic Republic, for instance, were not at all restricted to housework and the family; like in most socialist societies they were burdened with the double-role of housewives and occupational work outside the home. From early on they were socialized to being achievement oriented and were therefore less egalitarian minded and certainly less fatalistic than West German women (Trappe, 1992, 1997; Wegener and Liebig, 1993). Thus, in contrast to Western women, we would *not* want to locate them in the *low grid/strong group* segment of the four-fold table of thought styles. Something similar needs to be taken into account for the age variable: the historical development of East Germany has been remarkably discontinuous. This development was interrupted by radical shifts in the political and economic policies and repeated institutional reforms, thus creating a different social environment for almost every generation (Huinink and Mayer, 1993; Huinink *et al.*, 1995; Mayer and Solga, 1994). Most affected by this were the educational and occupational mobility prospects of certain age cohorts. Upward mobility had been extraordinarily high for the “founding generation” in the forties and fifties (Geißler, 1991; Korte, 1990; Mayer, 1995) where members of the manual working class rose to high positions almost overnight. The younger cohorts were not so privileged, but increasingly fell back to status-led mobility patterns—in spite of the socialist rhetoric. Differences in biographical experiences have therefore resulted in varying degrees of identification with the socialist ideals (Adler, 1991; Meier, 1990; Weidig, 1988). Paradoxically, therefore, in East Germany we see the older cling to the egalitarian ideals that socialism imposed normatively, whereas the younger support individualism and ascriptivism as justice ideologies.

Thus, grid–group theory does not suggest that structural properties of individuals have identical effects regardless of time and place. We must rather be prepared to find different structural influences in East and West Germany, if we find such influences at all.

DATA AND METHODS

We use the ISJP data of 1991 and 1996 for Germany, that is, of the 13 countries that participated in the ISJP, it is only East and West Germany we focus on. Identical questionnaires were administered in East and West in 1991 and 1996. Based on stratified probability samples in both regions and time points there are 1837 analyzable cases for East Germany in 1991, 1019 for West Germany in 1991, 1137 for East Germany in 1996, and 987 for West Germany in 1996 (Alwin and Wegener, 1995; Christoph *et al.*, 1998).⁸

With these data, our main concern will be whether the structural variables sex, age, occupational prestige, social mobility, and city size play a role in determining the four justice ideologies and in particular whether the effects these variables

⁸Note that in the following analyses we use weighted data due to the disproportional sample designs of the two German samples (Christoph *et al.*, 1998).

Table II. Factor Structure of Justice Ideologies

	Egalitarianism	Fatalism	Individualism	Ascriptivism	h^2
State: minimum standard of living	.596	-.005	-.080	-.116	.62
State: care for the welfare of citizens	.547	.166	-.071	.101	.66
State: provide a job for everyone	.515	.181	-.188	-.075	.66
It is hard to know what justice is	.233	.573	-.106	-.052	.61
Things cannot be changed	-.009	.551	.085	.158	.66
Income differences: everyone benefits	-.132	-.029	.682	.041	.51
Income differences: incentive for effort	-.011	.050	.421	.001	.82
Gender should be a basis for inequality	-.018	.143	.101	.422	.79
Wealth should allow for privileges	-.180	.004	.031	.364	.83
Variance explained	.482	.263	.167	.089	

Note. $N = 3107$; varimax rotation; Log Likelihood (4 factors): -3.338285 ; Likelihood Ratio Test 4 vs. 0 factors: $\chi^2_{36}: 3085.82$, $p_{\chi^2}: 0.0000$.

have are strong enough to replace explanations by east–west differences; that is, are sex or age differences, for instance, more important for explaining the variation in ideologies than the east–west (and the time series) dummies? If we find that they are, we will say that it is structure that determines the justice ideologies in question, not culture, and that rational justice ideologies rather than normative ideologies are at work. (See the Appendix for a description of the dependent and independent variables.)

However, we must begin by asking: can the four types of justice beliefs be empirically shown to exist? We use nine items from the questionnaire to define the four ideology factors (Table II).⁹ The resulting factor matrix of a maximum likelihood factor analysis exhibits four distinct factors very much in line with our four-fold scheme, regardless of whether we calculate from pooled data or from each of the four sub-populations separately.¹⁰ Thus, we can conclude that the four justice ideologies have empirical existence in East as well as West Germany, and that this is so also over the 5-year time period.

We proceed in two steps from here on: We will look at differences over time first, that is, whether the acceptance of the four justice ideologies in East and West Germany has changed from 1991 to 1996. If we find a change, we conclude that the justice ideology in question does not seem to be a normative ideology (*short-term variation approach*). Apart from that it will be interesting to see in which directions changes go and whether the changes appear in East and West simultaneously.

We will then seek explanations for ideological differences as well as change by regressing our structural features (sex, age, prestige, mobility, and city size) on the justice ideologies. Using a structural equation approach, the four justice beliefs

⁹See the Appendix for the wording of the indicator questions.

¹⁰Using a confirmatory factor analysis it can be shown however that East Germany in 1996 has a better goodness of fit than East Germany 1991 which would speak for a gradual “crystallization” of justice beliefs in East Germany over time.

are treated as latent constructs with the effects of the structural variables estimated simultaneously. We also estimate the east–west (and time series) effects, the focus of attention here being on whether east–west effects are observable even after introducing all the structural variables as controls. This is in line with the *residual variation approach* described above in that only if east–west effects remain we will be able to say that cultural differences play a role.

RESULTS

Changing Justice Ideologies 1991–1996

As the four-factor structure of the justice ideologies is stable over East and West Germany, and also over the two time points, we report in Table III mean factor scores for egalitarianism, fatalism, individualism, and ascriptivism for the four sample populations: East and West Germany 1991 and East and West Germany 1996. The standardized measures may be compared across the different groups. Looking at the “Difference” rows we see overtime changes, all of which are statistically significant.

Egalitarianism is reduced in both East and West over the 5-year period; but even though there is much less egalitarianism in the East in 1996 than there was in 1991, there is still a significant east–west difference in 1996, that is, East Germans in 1996 are still more egalitarian than West Germans are. In both East and West, fatalism has grown notably, and though it is true that in 1996 the difference in fatalism between East and West has become smaller, it is still significant: Easterners are more fatalistic than Westerners are, but also in the West there has been a sharp increase in fatalistic feelings from 1991 to 1996. It is remarkable that individualism has gone down in both the East and the West; but in 1996 West Germans still support individualistic justice views more strongly than East Germans. Finally,

Table III. Factor Scores Differences 1991–1996

	Egalitarianism	Fatalism	Individualism	Ascriptivism
West 91	–13.3	–16.6	13.0	–3.8
East 91	38.4	4.7	–12.9	–14.1
Difference	51.7 (17.69)	21.3 (7.17)	25.9 (8.26)	10.3 (4.89)
West 96	–31.9	7.1	6.3	15.1
East 96	14.2	17.4	–15.3	6.6
Difference	46.1 (13.29)	10.3 (3.27)	21.6 (6.89)	8.5 (3.10)
Reduction	5.6	11.0	4.3	1.8

Note. Factor scores multiplied by 100; absolute *t* values in parentheses.

ascriptivism in 1996 is stronger than it was in 1991 in both East and West; but again we find that West Germans tend more towards ascriptivism.

What can be concluded is, first, that East Germans in 1996 react more like West Germans did in 1991 (or vice versa), but as East and West Germans have in many cases shifted in parallel—less egalitarianism, more fatalism, less individualism and more ascriptivism—east–west differences remain. They are simply lifted to a different level. As of 1996, therefore, the two German regions are far from convergence with regard to the four justice ideologies, but they have become similar in the *direction* in which both have changed during the 5-year period. What we see then is that both parts of the country obviously respond in a similar way to the political and economic circumstances the country as a whole is confronted with.

Our second tentative conclusion is that where so much change can be observed, the involved justice ideologies can hardly be normative in nature; they do not seem to have been socialized thoroughly and are not culturally fixed. This is a finding which allows for an optimistic view of future developments: If we do find that much change in such a short time, East and West Germans will not have much difficulties moving even closer together in their justice beliefs in the near future.

East–West Effects, Trend Effects, Structural Effects

We next employ hierarchical structural equation models to establish the effects structural variables have on the variation of the justice ideologies. First, we estimate the east–west and time series effects (Table IV, Model 1); we then include the structural main effects of sex, age, prestige, mobility and city size (Model 2). In our third model (Table V), finally, we add interaction terms of the structural variables with all four sub-populations (East and West in 1991 and 1996). Note that West Germany of 1991 serves as the reference category in all the models.

Main Effects

Looking at Model 1 of Table IV, for all four latent ideological constructs we can see that there are strong east–west as well as time effects. In 1991, the East is stronger in egalitarianism and fatalism, weaker in individualism and ascriptivism. Over time this does not change, except that East Germany in 1996 is more ascriptivistic than West Germany was in 1991, but East Germany in 1996 is still less ascriptivistic than West Germany in 1996. With West Germany of 1991 as the reference category one can see clearly that it is not only the East but the West as well that exhibits large ideological changes from 1991 to 1996: there is in particular an increase in fatalism and ascriptivism and a decrease in individualism in the West.

This overall picture does not change dramatically when the structural controls are introduced in Model 2. Here we find, among other things, that women are generally more egalitarian than men, whereas high prestige respondents tend not

Table IV. Structural Equation Model: Main Effects

	Egalitarianism		Fatalism		Individualism		Ascriptivism	
	M ₁	M ₂	M ₁	M ₂	M ₁	M ₂	M ₁	M ₂
Region/time								
East-91	.2455*** (16.91)	.2394*** (16.96)	.0337* (1.96)	.0357* (2.11)	-.1475*** (-8.18)	-.1429*** (-8.00)	-.0452** (-2.72)	-.0334 (-1.92)
West-96	-.0224 (-1.85)	-.0218 (-1.91)	.1148*** (6.62)	.1058*** (6.28)	-.0544** (-3.09)	-.0618*** (-3.54)	.1435*** (8.23)	.1405*** (8.05)
East-96	.1677*** (12.58)	.1604*** (12.56)	.2193*** (12.07)	.2158*** (12.41)	-.1784*** (-9.76)	-.1822*** (-10.11)	.0959*** (5.62)	.1045*** (5.96)
Structural variables								
Sex (female = 1)		.0455*** (4.43)		.0073 (0.49)		-.0633*** (-4.08)		-.0177 (-1.15)
Age		.0145 (1.43)		.0617*** (4.13)		.0891*** (5.71)		.0789*** (5.12)
Prestige		-.0685*** (-6.44)		-.1955*** (-12.51)		-.0118 (-0.74)		-.1361*** (-8.59)
Mobility (upward = 1)		-.0183 (-1.77)		.0012 (0.07)		.0513** (3.25)		.0823*** (5.25)
City size		.0479*** (4.63)		.0099 (0.66)		-.0120 (-0.77)		.0444** (2.88)
R ²	.2377	.2730	.0842	.1674	.0607	.0900	.1014	.1495
Goodness-of-fit								
GFI	.9532	.9655						
AGFI	.9131	.9213						
RMR	.0685	.0489						

Note: N = 3701, unstandardized coefficients; t values in parentheses.
 * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.

Table V. Structural Equation Model: Interaction Effects

	Egalitarianism	Fatalism	Individualism	Ascriptivism
Region/time				
East-91	.0790 (1.50)	.0034 (0.05)	.0902 (1.13)	.1054 (1.35)
West-96	-.0894 (-1.55)	.1583* (1.98)	.0777 (0.89)	.1708* (2.00)
East-96	.0678 (1.26)	.2497*** (3.34)	-.0132 (-0.16)	.0619 (0.77)
Structural variables				
Sex (female = 1)	.0659*** (3.72)	.0332 (1.36)	-.1061*** (-3.97)	-.0707** (-2.69)
Age	-.0451** (-2.61)	.1010*** (4.22)	.2302*** (8.75)	.1091*** (4.24)
Prestige	-.0761*** (-3.83)	-.2634*** (-9.41)	.0211 (0.71)	-.1307*** (-4.44)
Mobility (upward = 1)	-.0020 (-0.11)	.0376 (1.51)	.0516 (1.90)	.0845** (3.16)
City size	.0381* (2.01)	.0022 (0.08)	-.0772** (-2.70)	.0583* (2.07)
Interaction effects ^a				
Sex × East-96		-.0518* (-2.01)		
Sex × West-96				.0760** (2.98)
Age × East-91	.1323*** (3.62)		-.2160*** (-3.92)	-.1206* (-2.22)
Age × West-96		-.1308** (-2.57)	-.2761*** (-4.95)	
Age × East-96	.1531*** (3.88)	-.1387* (-2.55)	-.2788*** (-4.69)	
Prestige × East-91	.1063*** (3.35)	.1347** (3.08)	-.1692*** (-3.54)	
Prestige × West-96	-.0799** (-2.62)	.1216** (2.89)		
Mobility × East-96			-.0605* (-1.97)	
Mobility × West-96		-.0896** (-2.96)		
City size × East-91				-.1051** (-2.63)
City size × East-96			.1190** (2.62)	
City size × West-96	.1345*** (4.19)			
Inclusion probability	-.0283** (-2.67)	-.0220 (-1.51)	.0566*** (3.54)	.0280 (1.78)
R ²	.3102	.2092	.1246	.1755
Goodness-of-fit				
GFI	.9786			
AGFI	.9185			
RMR	.0323			

Note. $N = 3701$, unstandardized coefficients; t values in parentheses.

^aOnly significant interaction effects are listed.

* $p_t < .05$; ** $p_t < .01$; *** $p_t < .001$.

to support egalitarianism. People in large cities are also more inclined towards egalitarian justice values.

Regarding fatalism, older and low prestige respondents display fatalistic feelings particularly strongly. Men and older age groups lean towards individualism, as do respondents who report upward occupational mobility in their most recent job shift. Finally, we see that older respondents, individuals in low prestige jobs and those who have been upward mobile favor ascriptivism. Persons living in large communities are more ascriptivistic as well. By and large this is all as expected; in their direct effects the structural attributes influence the justice ideologies in predictable ways. With due simplification, we can say that the structurally advantaged—men, older and high status individuals, and the upward mobile—endorse individualism and ascriptivism more than they endorse egalitarianism and fatalism.

Region-Specific Effects

Turning to Table V now, where we include *interaction terms* with the structural variables and the east–west and time series dummies, it is first worth noting that all region and time effects on egalitarianism disappear completely.¹¹ With regard to the east–west differences in 1991 this is also true for the other three ideologies. From this we conclude that the ideological east–west differences that we have seen in 1991 can be explained exclusively by respondents' structural features. The region someone comes from—East or West Germany—is of no importance for the justice attitudes he or she holds. Thus, in 1991 we see no “cultural” differences but differences that are only due to the positions in the social structure that respondents have.

So, with regard to egalitarianism, it is not the affiliation with the East or the West in itself that shapes the egalitarian justice ideology, but, as we can see from Table V, it is the older and the high prestige individuals in the East that strongly cling to egalitarianism, not only in 1991 but in 1996 also. This is not so in the West, where—in 1996 more than in 1991—high prestige incumbents tend to disfavor egalitarianism. Inhabitants of big communities in the West, in contrast, support egalitarianism strongly in 1996 more than in 1991. Therefore, though it is structure that determines egalitarian views, the way the structural effects work differ sharply in East and West.

The other latent constructs of the model show similar results. For fatalism, which in 1996 has increased in the East as well as in the West, there are positive East-1996 and West-1996 effects (but there is no east–west effect for 1991). However, women in East Germany are significantly less fatalistic than women

¹¹In Table V, we show only the statistically significant interaction effects, but all were tested. We also want to draw attention to the fact that using discrete dummy variables—like for the east–west regions and time—together with continuous variables in interaction terms, is likely to produce some ambivalence with regard to the *direct* effects of the continuous variables in that these effects cannot be tested for statistical significance. As has been shown, however, this shortcoming does not apply to the interaction effects themselves or to the direct effects of the dummies (Allison, 1977).

in the West. Younger people in both East and West prove to be more fatalistic in 1996 than in 1991. Although prestigious respondents are in general less fatalistic than the non-prestigious, they were more fatalistic in the East in 1991; but in 1996 respondents in high prestige occupations in the West are more fatalistic. Also, as we have predicted, downward mobile individuals tend to be fatalistic; this is markedly so in particular in West Germany in 1996.

Individualism that is generally stronger in the West than in the East, both in 1991 and 1996, is a justice ideology that is supported more by older than by younger people. But by 1996, the younger have grown more individualistic—in the East and the West. An explicitly negative view on individualism is taken by the high prestige incumbents in East Germany, particularly in 1991, whereas the residents of large cities in the East have by 1996 come to be more individualistic. For individualism it is particularly evident that in 1996 all direct east–west as well as time effects have disappeared, giving special emphasis to the fact that individualism is not a normative ideology but one that is determined by social position only.

Ascriptivism is more pronounced in West Germany in 1996 compared to in 1991, but we see that women are less ascriptivistic. This has changed in 1996: in the West the women are now more ascriptive. Older people are more ascriptivistic, except in the East in 1991 where the younger were more ascriptivistic, and low prestige respondents as well as the upward mobile favor ascriptivism. In large cities, people in the East were less ascriptive in 1991, but this is no longer so in 1996.

Finally, we should take note of the fact that the explanatory power of the structural variables is much greater for egalitarianism and fatalism and less so for individualism and ascriptivism (r^2 of 31.0 and 20.9% vs. 12.5 and 17.6%). This is in accordance with earlier findings (Ritzman and Toaskovic-Devey, 1992; Wegener and Liebig, 1993) that egalitarian views and fatalistic feelings vary strongly between social groups, whereas individualism in particular is in many respects the “dominant ideology” of modern societies (Abercrombie *et al.*, 1990; Kluegel and Smith, 1986).

Selection Model

We finally address the fact that by using job information in the models, as for instance occupational prestige and job mobility, we restrict our analyses to those respondents who have had a job at the time of the surveys and, in addition, to those who have experienced at least one job shift in their career. This is a systematic reduction in sample size that may lead to a selectivity bias. In order to deal with this selection, we have estimated the likelihood for respondents not falling into our analysis sample, that is, the probability of people being out of work and not having had a previous job (because only job holders with one previous job as a minimum will have experienced a job shift). We use Heckman’s two-step consistent estimator approach and include individual probabilities as an instrumental variable in the models (Berk and Subhash, 1982; Heckman, 1979) to control for selection.

The regression coefficient of the inclusion probability variable indicates the effect of being employed (and having had a previous job) on the latent constructs. Thus, we can see from Table V, for instance, that individuals who are employed are less egalitarian than jobless persons. This can be concluded from the negative (significant) coefficient of the inclusion probability. Similarly, respondents in jobs (who have also had job shifts) are more individualistic than those out of jobs (without job shifts), whereas no “employment effects” are noticeable for fatalism and ascriptivism.¹²

CONCLUSIONS

With regard to justice ideologies, the question we have posed in this paper was whether anything can be said about the permanence and stability of the ideological “inner wall” that is supposed to be running through Germany today. We did indeed corroborate that such an internal divide exists: at least in terms of justice ideologies, east–west differences are enormous, and they have not become smaller over the 5-year period we can document with data. Though there is a common set of justice ideologies in East and West Germany (evidenced in one and the same factor structure) giving credibility to the structuralist approach of grid–group theory, the extent to which the different ideologies are supported even in 1996 differs in both parts of the country. There is less egalitarianism both in East and West in 1996 compared to 5-years before, but the East is still more egalitarian. Fatalism has increased in East and West, but again the East is still ahead in fatalism. Also, we find less individualism in the East as well as in the West in 1996, but, as in 1991, the West scores much higher in individualism. Finally, ascriptivism has risen in East and West, but it has done so less in the East than in the West. Thus, although over the 5-year period the justice beliefs have grown closer to some extent, striking east–west differences remain.

This is primarily due to the fact, however, that the changes we have observed have taken place predominantly in the West: in the years after unification the West has moved towards the justice ideologies held in East Germany, thus making less visible the efforts East Germans have made to become more like West Germans. Because there is change not only in the East but in the West as well, east–west differences persist—but on a modified level. Thus, the “inner wall” still stands.

However, from the multiple changes we observe on both sides, we can optimistically conclude that the differences between eastern and western justice ideologies are short-lasting in nature; they are definitely not caused by cultural differences and by enduringly socialized values—normative values—that are not easily affected by change. During the 5-years that we can cover, East and West

¹²A part from this interpretation of the regression coefficients of the inclusion probability, it is important to see whether or not the other coefficients in the models change when the instrumental variable is added. We do not show this here, but coefficients of the four ideology constructs stay unaffected when the inclusion probability variables are introduced, thus rendering it unlikely that a selectivity bias is at work.

Germans were exposed to the same political and economic conditions *as members of a unified country*, obviously leading to parallel shifts in their justice ideologies. The differences that we still find must be attributed to differences of the structural features of the respondents, not to cultural differences. It can be predicted therefore that both parts of Germany will grow closer in their justice ideals as the living conditions on both sides of the former border become even more similar. If there are still going to be “inner walls” with regard to ideological beliefs in Germany, they will divide different subgroups of the population but not the East from the West.

APPENDIX: DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES

Dependent Variables

Egalitarianism	The government should guarantee everyone a minimum standard of living (5-point scale). The state has the duty to care for the well being of its citizens and therefore has to provide financial cover in case of personal hazards using tax revenues (5-point scale). The government should provide a job for everyone who wants one (5-point scale).
Fatalism	The way things are these days, it is hard to know what is just anymore (5-point scale). There is no point arguing about social justice since it is impossible to change things (5-point scale).
Individualism	There is an incentive for individual effort only if differences in income are large enough (5-point scale). It is all right if businessmen make good profits because everyone benefits in the end (5-point scale).
Ascriptivism	Please tell me how much influence each of these factors should have in determining the level of pay for an employee: Being a man and not a woman (5-point scale)? Three patients are admitted to a hospital at the same time, all suffering from a form of heart disease requiring surgery. However, the limited resources of the hospital allow only one heart operation each month. All three cases are equally urgent. The patient who is treated first will have a better chance of survival. The patient who can afford to pay most is treated first (4-point scale).

Independent Variables

Region/Time	West Germany 1991 (reference category), East Germany 1991, West Germany 1996, East Germany 1996
Sex	Female = 1
Age	Age in years
Prestige	Magnitude Prestige Scale (MPS) of R's occupation based on ISCO-68 (Wegener, 1988).
Mobility	Job mobility at the last job shift (difference in MPS scores): upward = 1, downward or no change in occupational prestige = 0
City size	Size of community in which R is living (1: less than 2,000; 2: 2,000 to 4,999; 3: 5,000 to 19,999; 4: 20,000 to 49,999; 5: 50,000 to 99,999; 6: 100,000 to 499,999; 7: 500,000 and more inhabitants).

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